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RE-DEFINING REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 
KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING 
OF LIBERTY. By Dorothy Roberts. New York: Pantheon Books, 1997. 312 
pp. $26.00 (cloth). 
Reproductive freedom is at the heart of women's equality. Women who 
cannot control when they will conceive and how many children they will 
have cannot be free and equal participants in family, social, political and 
economic life. Nor can they take advantage of the equal rights women 
have won in the courts and the legislatures. Without reproductive auton-
omy, guarantees of equality elsewhere are illusory. 
America has a long and deplorable history of oppressing and abusing 
women's right to control their reproductive destiny. For years, proscrip-
tion of abortion forced women to rely on dangerous and even life-threat-
ening procedures. While restrictions on abortion forced women to carry 
pregnancies to term, other practices such as irreversible surgical sterili-
zation, restrictive welfare policies and even criminal punishment have 
been implemented to ensure that women-especially poor women-do 
not become pregnant in the first place. Not until Griswold v. Connecticut 
in 1965 did the Supreme Court first protect women's reproductive free-
dom by invalidating an archaic Connecticut criminal law that prohibited 
the mere use of birth control.1 The Court's 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade, 
which provided a constitutional guarantee of a woman's right to choose 
abortion, emerged from a long and remarkable battle to include a right 
to sexual privacy among Americans' individualliberties.2 
Volumes have been written about women's epic-and ongoing-strug-
gle to carve a sphere of privacy that places bedroom and womb beyond 
the reach of government.3 By and large, the story is portrayed as one of 
women's triumph over governmental control of their bodies and their 
conceptions of morality: women have, after all, "won" the "right" to use 
contraceptives and to choose abortion (at least within the Roe frame-
work).4 Of course, from the moment of victory, the "victors" in these 
1 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
z Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
3 See, e.g., DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND 
THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE (1994). 
4 One strand of late 20th-century feminism rejects the idea that the availability of 
contraception and abortion has contributed to a more liberated female sexuality, arguing 
rather that heterosexual relations are by definition oppressive in a society where genders 
are unequal and that legal abortion enhances women's vulnerability to sexual coercion 
by men. See, e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN, RIGHT-WING WOMEN 77-100 (1983); CATHARINE 
A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 93-102 (1987). 
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battles have been looking over their shoulders, always acutely aware that 
their victories are hard-fought, narrowly won and constantly in danger 
of being overturned or denigrated by conservative courts and legisla-
tures.5 Nevertheless, most Americans view reproductive autonomy and 
privacy generally as resting on firm ground now that landmark cases 
such as Griswold and Roe are part of our constitutional pantheon. 
For Dorothy Roberts, however, the traditional concept of reproductive 
autonomy that centers on the right to use contraception and choose 
abortion is far too narrow. In Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduc-
tion, and the Meaning of Liberty, Roberts explores what she perceives 
as a stark racial divide in the struggle for women's reproductive rights, 
a fault line that was formed early in America's history when slave 
owners forcibly bred, raped and otherwise exploited their female en-
slaved persons with the explicit approbation of law. Roberts chides 
feminists for tacitly adopting a narrow view of reproductive freedom and 
failing to address the myriad reproductive concerns of Black women. In 
Roberts's view, the history of the movement for reproductive autonomy 
has literally been whitewashed. While most middle- and upper-class 
white women may be content with the sexual and reproductive rights 
they have won, Roberts charges that Black women, whose use of con-
traceptives often has been written into law as an affirmative duty, are 
hardly beneficiaries of the movement for reproductive freedom. Rather, 
legal, societal and political barriers continue to prevent Black women 
from fully exercising their reproductive freedom. According to Roberts, 
Black women in America continue to experience the litany of horribles 
that the battle for reproductive freedom has eradicated for white women-
including such degrading practices as mandatory sterilization. 
Roberts believes that "[ w ]e are in the midst of an explosion of rhetoric 
and policies that degrade Black women's reproductive decisions." (p. 3) 
In chapters focusing on new birth control methods ushered in by tech-
nological advances, welfare proposals conditioning receipt of benefits on 
a woman's use of contraception, laws prohibiting federal funding for 
abortions, and criminal prosecutions of drug-addicted mothers for child 
5 The 25 years since Roe v. Wade have seen a constant barrage of anti-abortion 
legislation designed to circumvent Supreme Court rulings. These laws have, for the most 
part, been struck down, generating a new round of legislation and a new round of 
litigation. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) 
(holding that statutes giving third parties veto power over a woman's decision to choose 
abortion were unconstitutional); Co1autti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (striking down 
statute proscribing abortions when the fetus is or "may be" viable on void-for-vagueness 
grounds). In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has upheld significant restrictions on 
the right to abortion, and a plurality of the Court has indicated that it would abandon 
the trimester system of Roe. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 
(1989) (upholding bar on state employees performing abortions and bar on the use of 
public facilities for performing abortions, even when the patient pays for the abortion 
herself). 
1998] Book Reviews 329 
abuse, Roberts examines how modem reproductive policies threaten to 
shackle Black women to the degraded images of Black motherhood that 
have burdened their exercise of reproductive autonomy since the colonial 
period. 
Roberts sets out to establish and explore the intersection between race 
and reproduction in order to change our conception of reproductive 
freedom. She urges us to see reproductive freedom as a matter of social 
justice, not merely of individual choice. Roberts notes that decisions 
regarding reproduction are made in a social context characterized by, 
among other things, substantial economic and educational inequalities. 
In Roberts's view, the harm from restrictive welfare laws and criminal 
prosecutions-which, she notes, disproportionately affect Black women-
is not simply the incursion on each Black woman's decision-making. 
Rather, such laws also diminish the value of Black motherhood, which 
is in tum "a badge of racial inferiority worn by all Black people." (p. 
310) In other words, the personal is political.6 
According to Roberts, "[r]eproductive politics in America inevitably 
involves racial politics." (p. 9) Roberts seeks to link modem racial 
politics directly to the American historical backdrop of control and 
manipulation of Black women's bodies by both private individuals and 
government actors. To explore this bridge to the past, Roberts chooses 
as her vehicles of instruction several current reproductive policies that 
have sparked considerable debate. According to Roberts: "Highlighting 
the racial dimensions of contemporary debates such as welfare reform, 
the safety of Norplant, public funding of abortion, and the morality of 
new reproductive technologies is like shaking up a kaleidoscope and 
taking another look." (p. 6) By "taking another look" at reproductive 
freedom through provocative, racially-sensitive lenses, Roberts hopes to 
re-define the meaning of reproductive freedom to take into account its 
relationship to racial oppression. 
Peeking into Roberts's freshly "shaken" kaleidoscope requires that we 
re-examine the significance of birth control to women's reproductive 
freedom. For most white women, access to birth control signifies a 
significant step toward individual autonomy and self-definition and is an 
integral aspect of privacy. However, Roberts notes that for Black women, 
the historical regulation of their childbearing to achieve certain social 
objectives largely overshadows whatever autonomy they might have gained 
by their access to birth control. Slavery "marked Black women from the 
beginning as objects whose decisions about reproduction should be sub-
ject to social regulation rather than to their own will." (p. 23) Roberts 
contends that the birth control and eugenic movements of the early 
6 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 191 
(1989). 
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1900s picked up where slavery left off, with some advocates in those 
movements calling for the reduction, if not the complete elimination, of 
certain races and ethnicities in order to improve society. Since the early 
1900s, contraception and its more sinister cousin, surgical sterilization, 
have been used not to free Black women to pursue their goals and 
dreams, but deliberately to limit their procreation.7 
According to Roberts, the false assumption underlying the often inhu-
mane regulation of Black women's reproduction is that procreation, and 
not political, social and economic forces, is the cause of Blacks' condi-
tion in this country. She states: "America's recent eugenic past should 
serve as a warning of the dangerous potential inherent in the notion that 
social problems are caused by reproduction and can be cured by popu-
lation control." (p. 59) Roberts explains that white myths and stereo-
types concerning Black motherhood have long been used to justify white 
control of Black women's reproductive decisions. Images of Black women 
as unwed mothers, welfare queens, mammies and Jezebels, manufactured 
in popular culture and academic circles, have branded Black women as 
unfit for motherhood in whites' eyes and have been used by whites to 
justify the regulation of every aspect of Black women's fertility. In 
Roberts's opinion, today's lawmakers continue to craft reproductive poli-
cies with these stereotypes in mind. They have, in Roberts's view, utterly 
failed to heed the lessons of the past. 
Roberts correctly notes the fallacy that Black reproduction is the sole 
cause of Blacks' social problems and that population control can miracu-
lously cure those problems. Policies designed to reduce the number of 
babies born to welfare mothers, for example, may ultimately reduce the 
strain on the public budget to some degree, but pinning the blame for 
Blacks' social condition on Black fertility rates alone demonstrates a 
short-sighted and pernicious penchant for scapegoating and a failure to 
appreciate the magnitude and complexity of the problems that must be 
solved if Blacks are to experience equality in the exercise of reproduc-
tive and other freedoms. 
It is equality, not liberty, with which Roberts is ultimately concerned. 
Roberts finds the traditional view of liberty-that individuals should be 
able to make choices free from governmental interference8-entirely 
wanting when it comes to reproductive freedom, particularly for Black 
women. According to Roberts, this construct of liberty as a "negative 
right" (p. 309) masks social prejudices and the maldistribution of wealth 
7 Roberts places Margaret Sanger, the strongest feminist advocate for birth control in 
the early part of the century, under fire for her eventual alliance with certain eugenic 
interests. However, Roberts ultimately dismisses the charge that Sanger was a racist: "It 
appears that Sanger was motivated by a genuine concern to improve the health of the 
poor mothers she served rather than a desire to eliminate their stock." (p. 81) 
8 See, e.g., ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR EsSAYS ON LIBERTY 121-31 (1969). 
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and education. It allows, and may even encourage, the coercion of Black 
women in their reproductive decision-making by concealing the racist 
origins of social practices that, while not overtly discriminatory on the 
basis of race, disproportionately deny Black women's reproductive free-
dom. Roberts advocates a group identity approach to reproductive free-
dom that is concerned with social harms as well as individual choice. 
She does not wish to abandon negative liberty altogether; it does, after 
all, protect against the abuse of government power and stress the value 
of self-definition, which are both critical to overcoming a history of 
denigration of Black women. However, Roberts clearly supports the 
primacy of equality over liberty. Roberts's ultimate goal is to "ensure 
the equal distribution of procreative resources in society." (p. 296) 
Roberts advances "a notion of reproductive freedom that combines the 
values captured by both liberty and equality." (p. 305) Like other femi-
nist scholars, she prefers a notion of positive liberty to the negative 
liberty that has allowed inequalities to flourish. She defines positive 
liberty rather loosely as "the affirmative duty of government to protect 
the individual's personhood from degradation and to facilitate the proc-
esses of choice and self-determination."9 (p. 309) For example, instead 
of prosecuting poor Black women for drug and child abuse, Roberts 
argues that the government should provide them with subsistence benefits, 
drug treatment and medical care. This assistance, in Roberts's view, is 
the minimum required for "reproductive justice." (p. 311) Thus, repro-
ductive justice, as Roberts sees it, is achievable only through the pursuit 
of reproductive and sexual rights that are grounded not in a negative 
right of privacy, but in a positive concept of self-determination, rooted 
in equal justice and requiring social and economic support. Roberts 
would not lay the duty of supporting positive liberty solely at the door-
step of the government; she deems private actors equally responsible for 
distributing-or redistributing-the wealth of reproductive resources. 
Much can be gained from Roberts's approach. Roberts's exploration 
of reproductive oppression during slavery and the eugenic movement of 
the early 1900s certainly provides ample reason to view with skepticism 
any public policies that seek to incorporate birth control as a stick to 
force compliance with government mandates. As Roberts convincingly 
demonstrates, poor women, who have little choice in the matter, have 
been beaten with such sticks for years. Roberts opens our eyes to a world 
in which access to contraception does not necessarily enhance reproduc-
9 Other scholars have espoused the concept of positive liberty. See, e.g., Rhonda 
Copelan, Losing the Negative Right of Privacy: Building Sexual and Reproductive 
Freedom, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 15 (1990). It gained substantial momentum 
as a result of the post-Roe attacks on abortion rights and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186 (1986) (upholding, at least as to homosexual sodomy, a Georgia statute making all 
sodomy criminal). 
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tive freedom. In fact, for women dependent upon public assistance who 
"choose" to use contraception under the threat of loss of benefits or 
imprisonment, reproductive freedom is only an elusive dream. Roberts 
is surely correct that the lives of these women, who are disproportion-
ately Black, are shaped by a constellation of factors: psychological, 
sociological, physiological and economic. Until they gain access to edu-
cation, improved medical care and some level of subsistence benefits, 
equality will undoubtedly remain illusory. 10 
While these truths are incontestable, other aspects of Roberts's ap-
proach are not. She claims to be shaking up a kaleidoscope to offer a 
fresh look at reproductive freedom. Kaleidoscopes are, of course, char-
acterized by endlessly changing colors and patterns. Roberts, on the 
other hand, sees only black and white and a single unceasing pattern-
the use by whites of myths and stereotypes to justify their control over 
Black women's reproductive decisions. Roberts decries the use by some 
lawmakers of rhetoric to advance their views and policies. Unfortu-
nately, Roberts sometimes falls victim to her own criticism, unleashing 
her own "explosion of rhetoric" (p. 3) and recognizable catch-phrases in 
an attempt to shock us into seeing her point. 11 Roberts invokes the dark 
specter of Nazism and "racial genocide"12 (p. 21) as lurking behind 
coercive welfare policies and criminal punishment of crack-abusing moth· 
ers. She wants us to see "how the denial of Black reproductive autonomy 
serves the interests of white supremacy." (p. 5) She speaks of the "tor-
ture" (p. 122) of Black women's bodies and characterizes restrictive 
American welfare policies and proposals to encourage poor women to 
use advances in birth control technology as schemes in a "worldwide 
effort to reduce dark-skinned populations." (p. 143) Placed in Roberts's 
newly "shaken" but rather deliberately arranged kaleidoscope, birth con-
trol itself appears not as a positive step toward women's autonomy, but 
rather as a weapon being used in a race war with world-wide implica-
tions. 
loJ See ROSALIND PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUAL• 
ITY AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 390 (2d ed. 1990). 
11 Roberts does not shy away from stereotypes either. She appears to believe that the 
beliefs of "most" white Americans' concerning welfare were formed by reading conser-
vative scholars such as Charles Murray (p. 113), that Meg Ryan's performance in the 
movie When a Man Loves a Woman helped to establish white Americans' vision of drug-
and alcohol-abusing white mothers (p. 179), and that the popularity among whites of 
surrogate parenting soared after an episode of the Phil Donahue Show featured a 
blond-haired, blue-eyed baby (pp. 270-71). While these stereotypes do not begin to 
replicate the cruelty or harm of the stereotypes historically created by popular culture 
and fastened to Black women, they tend to undermine Roberts's arguments and her 
credibility. 
12 Roberts notes "a deep suspicion in the minds of many Black Americans that 
white-dominated family-planning programs are a form of racial genocide." (p. 21) 
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The evidence Roberts presents to demonstrate such overt racism often 
falls far short of her rhetorical charges. Take Norplant, the contraceptive 
device that consists of five matchstick-sized capsules implanted in a 
woman's arm that deliver contraceptive hormones continuously over a 
five-year period. According to Roberts, racial politics created Norplant, 
which she calls the "latest threat to reproductive autonomy." (p. 105) 
Roberts's evidence of eugenic and racist motivations for the creation and 
distribution of Norplant is exceedingly thin. Relying principally on alle-
gations made by plaintiffs in class action complaints, Roberts pronounces 
that "Norplant may be hazardous to your health," and she claims that 
Norplant amounts to "torture" of Black women because it pumps "dan-
gerous hormones" into their bodies. (p. 122) Yet Roberts herself points 
out that Norplant utilizes "the same type of progestin used in some birth 
control pills" (p. 1 05) and "can cause the same long list of bodily 
disruptions as the pill." (p. 122) Is the pill, therefore, also a form of 
torture? Roberts also brands the Population Council, which developed 
Norplant, a racist organization because, according to Roberts, it is "closely 
linked" (p. 141) with the eugenic movement. What is Roberts's basis for 
suggesting that the Population Council and the eugenic movement are 
closely linked? Forty-five years ago, the Population Council's president 
supported eugenics. What has occurred, and who has presided, at the 
Population Council since the 1950s seem not to concern Roberts at all. 
Consider also Roberts's evidence concerning the following issues: 
restrictive policies aimed at public health clinics, coercive welfare pro-
posals that seek to encourage or even mandate the implantation of Nor-
plant, and criminal child-abuse prosecutions that condition a woman's 
freedom on the use of contraceptives. In 1988, the Department of Health 
and Human Services issued regulations prohibiting federally funded family 
planning clinics from advising patients that abortion is one of their 
options. Roberts charges that this so-called "Gag Rule" violates the 
autonomy of patients who rely on public clinics, patients who are dis-
proportionately Black women. But as Roberts correctly notes, in 1993 
President Clinton revoked the Gag Rule by executive order. Roberts also 
concedes that, to date, no proposed legislation offering bonuses to wel-
fare mothers for the use of Norplant or mandating Norplant implantation 
or other birth control as a condition of receiving benefits has generated 
sufficient support to be enacted into law. While some women who abuse 
drugs during their pregnancies have been ordered as a condition of 
probation in criminal cases to have Norplant inserted, courts of appeals 
uniformly have rejected this form of punishment.13 Roberts also admits 
that she cannot determine from any available data the number of women-
13 Roberts notes: "No appellate court has ever upheld the imposition of any form of 
birth control as a condition of probation." (p. 195) 
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or, presumably, the number of Black, Hispanic or white women-who 
have been forced as a condition of probation to have Norplant inserted. 
The available data indicates only that, "[o]f four defendants ordered to 
use Norplant within its first year on the U.S. market, all were on welfare 
and three were nonwhite." (p. 196) This statistically irrelevant sample 
is not convincing proof of an overtly racist motivation behind forced 
Norplant implantation. Indeed, it tells us only that women who are poor 
have suffered the indignity of being told that they must not conceive any 
children for five years on pain of incarceration. 
Roberts's historical and anecdotal evidence concerning the application 
of restrictive welfare and reproductive policies generally supports the 
notion that poor women of all races have been victimized.14 As Roberts 
points out throughout the book, what makes such policies and punish~ 
ments politically palatable is not only the race of the women affected, 
but also their poverty and marital status. For example, Roberts claims 
that crack mothers are penalized "because the combination of their 
poverty, race, and marital status is seen to make them unworthy of 
procreating." (p. 305) Thus, the larger threat is not only to poor Black 
women, but also to all poor and marginalized women who live under a 
regime that uses coercion and inducements to secure their "choice" not 
to procreate. In sum, if an agenda of racial genocide lurks behind mod~ 
ern reproductive policies, Roberts has failed to uncover it. 
While Roberts is no doubt sympathetic to the plight of poor women 
in general, she is convinced that, when it comes to reproductive policies, 
class and race are "inextricably linked." (p. 110) Her theory is that by 
focusing myopically on the problem of Black welfare mothers, the media 
have created a powerful image that drives decisions concerning repro~ 
ductive policies. She states: "The American public associates welfare 
payments to single mothers with the mythical Black 'welfare queen,' 
who deliberately becomes pregnant in order to increase the amount of 
her monthly check. The welfare queen represents laziness, chicanery, 
and economic burden all wrapped up in one powerful image:• (p. 111) 
As a result, according to Roberts, "[w]hen Americans debate welfare 
reform, most have single Black mothers in mind." (p. 110) The link 
between race and welfare is firmly implanted in the American mind. 
More importantly, as Roberts also notes, welfare policies will always 
disproportionately affect Black women, since as a percentage of the 
population more Black women than white women rely on public assis~ 
tance. Whether or not restrictive laws and proposals concerning welfare 
14 On several occasions, Roberts references Carrie Buck, the "feebleminded" white girl 
whose forced sterilization spawned the now-infamous declaration by Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes that "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough." Buck v. Bell, 274 
u.s. 200, 207 (1927). 
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and reproduction are overtly or covertly targeted at Black women, these 
women will disproportionately bear the burdens and suffer the conse-
quences of their enactment. 
Roberts is correct that these pernicious images have affected our 
country's debates concerning welfare, reproduction and criminal justice. 
On a more tangible level, some evidence exists that these images also 
affect the solutions that are proposed for perceived problems. Unfortu-
nately, Roberts does not allow her evidence simply to speak for itself. 
Roberts possesses the evidence to show convincingly that certain facially 
neutral proposals and laws do not have neutral effects.15 Admittedly, an 
approach that focuses on disproportionate impact rather than intentional 
bias turns a dimmer spotlight on the plight of Black women. Neverthe-
less, sufficient evidence exists to alert us to racial bias. 
Roberts's chapter on criminal justice and reproduction, which is the 
most provocative chapter in her book, is a good example. Roberts notes 
that growing numbers of women have been indicted after giving birth to 
babies who test positive for drugs, particularly crack cocaine. Roberts 
charges that prosecutors have indicted these women not to protect their 
fetuses, but "as a way of punishing Black women for having babies." 
(p. 154) After all, Roberts points out, the crime hinges not on the use 
of drugs but rather on the decision to have a baby. A woman who 
chooses to have an abortion in such circumstances can avoid prosecution 
altogether. According to Roberts, media sensationalism in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s of a "crack baby" epidemic "indelibly etched in the 
American psyche" (p. 159) the image of a Black mother incapable of 
caring for her child. 16 Roberts states that "[t]he monstrous crack-smok-
ing mother was added to the iconography of depraved Black maternity, 
alongside the matriarch and the welfare queen. Crack gave society one 
more reason to curb Black women's fertility." (p. 157) Roberts charges 
that white prosecutors and judges, swept up in this media hype, launched 
an assault that has resulted in the "punishment of poor Black women 
who fail to meet the middle-class ideal of motherhood." (p. 179) Roberts 
believes that these prosecutors and judges literally "invented the crime 
of prenatal drug use in the 1980s in order to castigate poor Black 
mothers who smoke crack." (p. 187) 
It is true that the wealth of evidence regarding maternal and child 
health conditions in the United States has been ignored in favor of a 
bizarre and inappropriate obsession with drug use by pregnant women. 
The focus on pregnant drug users seems quite hypocritical considering 
15 See Ruth Colker, An Equal Protection Analysis of United States Reproductive Health 
Policy: Gender, Race, Age, and Class, 1991 DUKE L.J. 324, 329, 362. 
16 In Roberts's view, the media exaggerated the harmful effect of crack use on children. 
She states: "The data on the extent and severity of crack's impact on babies are highly 
controversial, to say the least." (p. 157) 
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the fact that many women use tobacco and alcohol during pregnancy, 
substances that can be just as harmful to the fetus. Yet society apparently 
accepts this maternal behavior much more readily. There have been two 
responses to the issue of maternal drug abuse, both punitive. The overtly 
punitive response, and the one that Roberts focuses on in her book, is 
seen in the criminal prosecution of pregnant substance abusers on charges 
ranging from delivering drugs to a minor to manslaughter or assault with 
a deadly weapon.17 The second response to this problem, to which Roberts 
pays scant attention but which affects many more lives than will ever be 
reached through criminal prosecution, has been increased vigilance in 
the enforcement of civil child abuse and neglect laws against pregnant 
users of controlled substances. 
These punitive responses demonstrate the validity of two important 
points that Roberts raises. The first point is that an approach to the 
problems of infant morbidity and mortality that focuses on maternal drug 
abuse will result in a disproportionate number of Black women being 
prosecuted for child abuse. Whether intended or not, the number of 
Black mothers who will be reported to authorities for suspected drug 
abuse will be substantially higher than the number of white mothers. 
Black women's disproportionate use of public hospitals and their more 
frequent contacts with government agencies will ensure that authorities 
are notified of their crimes, as will a myopic focus on crack abuse as 
opposed to other harmful drugs. 18 Indeed, as Roberts notes, the evidence 
shows that despite relatively equal rates of drug use, Black women are 
nearly ten times more likely than white women to be reported to state 
agencies for substance abuse during pregnancy. 19 (p. 175) Since none of 
the reporting laws passed in response to the problem of maternal drug 
abuse differentiate among the various illicit substances, marijuana users 
should not be treated differently than cocaine users. The relatively equal 
extent of drug use among Black and white women should generate equal 
numbers of reports to state agencies. The fact that the numbers are 
nowhere close to equal is evidence of race bias in reporting. 
The punitive response to maternal drug abuse also demonstrates the 
validity of a second point Roberts makes-that negative liberty simply 
17 This practice has been criticized on both legal and policy grounds as being unconsti· 
tutionally discriminatory and unlikely to deter substance abuse by pregnant users. See, 
e.g., Kary Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 13 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 278 
(1990). 
18 Roberts charges that "targeting crack use during pregnancy unfairly singles out 
Black women for punishment." (p. 178) 
19 See also Ira J. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During 
Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1204 (1990) (stating that in Pinellas County a black woman is 9.6 
times more likely than a white woman to be reported for substance abuse during 
pregnancy). 
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is not a sufficient response to the inequality that poor Black women 
continue to experience. Randall Kennedy, among others, has argued that 
criminal prosecutions of mothers who abuse drugs are a positive step 
toward achieving protection of Black children in the criminal justice 
system.2° Kennedy agrees that Black women are prosecuted in such cases 
in disproportionately high numbers, but notes that if white mothers were 
disproportionately prosecuted for such crimes, it would be taken as proof 
that prosecutors care more about white babies than Black babies. Roberts 
disagrees that this prosecutorial focus is a positive development for 
Black mothers and children. Roberts has difficulty accepting that prose-
cutors and judges are acting in the best interest of Black children, given 
the historical use of criminal laws to subjugate Blacks. Women faced 
with the prospect that their disclosure of drug abuse to a physician will 
trigger a state child abuse and neglect reporting statute will hide their 
addictions or, worse, fail to seek prenatal treatment at all. Roberts cor-
rectly challenges the notion that putting mothers in jail will somehow 
lead to healthy children. Rather than punishing these women, Roberts 
believes that resources should be devoted to ending women's drug abuse 
before they become pregnant. That is a proposal that can be readily 
supported regardless of racial predicate or evidence of invidious dis-
crimination. 
Like criminal penalties, family cap laws that deny benefits to women 
who have a threshold number of children and proposals for coercing 
women to use contraception by limiting or denying subsistence benefits 
altogether are poor solutions to such social problems. These laws, which 
affect all poor women but affect Black women disproportionately, are a 
desperate response to a seemingly unending cycle of dependence. In 
their desperation, however, lawmakers have opted for a quick fix rather 
than a long-term solution. Autonomy requires a wide array of social 
supports that guarantee preconditions for self-realization such as shelter, 
food, day care, health care and education. Autonomy presumes the avail-
ability to each person of meaningful work and relationships as well as 
the opportunity for political, social and cultural engagement. In short, 
autonomy requires the equality promised by positive liberty. 
While Roberts's notion of positive liberty generally portends well for 
poor women of all races, in a sense the concept of liberty as Roberts 
has constructed it may ultimately curtail reproductive freedom for some 
women. This negative aspect of Roberts's positive liberty comes through 
in her chapter entitled "Race and the New Reproduction," which exam-
ines new reproductive technologies, including surrogacy and in vitro 
fertilization. This chapter is a rather curious exception to the other 
20 See Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A 
Comment, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1255 (1994). 
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chapters of the book. Here there is no forcible contraception, no 
degrading formal sterilization or any other sort of government-man-
dated or privately supported curtailment of Black fertility. The new 
technology is not being used to restrict the liberty of Black women; in 
fact, its sole purpose is to expand the reproductive options available to 
women. 
Roberts's interest in these new technologies and practices is driven 
not by her interest in reproduction in general, but rather by her "interest 
in the devaluation of Black reproduction." (p. 246) According to Roberts, 
just as policies that prevent births are shaped by race, so too are policies 
that assist births. That is so, according to Roberts, because these new 
technologies are "used almost exclusively by white people." (p. 251) 
Roberts worries that "[b]y strengthening the ideology that white people 
deserve to procreate while Black people do not, the new reproduction 
may worsen racial inequality." (p. 283) She sees in these scientific 
advances the ghost of "positive eugenics"-the notion that by increasing 
the number of births from "superior" parents, one can somehow improve 
society. (p. 283) Roberts readily acknowledges that the racial disparity 
in the use of new technologies "will hardly alter the demographic com-
position of the country." (p. 283) She also acknowledges that the market 
(infertile couples pay $8,000 to $20,000 for each pregnancy attempt, p. 
253) and cultural differences (Roberts notes that even wealthy Black 
couples generally eschew these technologies, p. 259), not any overt or 
covert racism, appear to drive the availability and use of the new tech-
nology. The harm she sees is ideological in nature-the disproportionate 
use of new technologies by whites, according to Roberts, sends the 
message that the relative value of Blacks is less than the relative value 
of whites in America. 
Apparently, not every woman's personhood and choice and self-deter-
mination merit protection and facilitation under Roberts's view of "re-
productive justice." (p. 311) Indeed, Roberts seems untroubled by the 
conclusion that balancing the scales of "social justice" might require that 
the government restrict the availability of certain new reproductive tech-
nologies to white (and other) couples who can afford them. (p. 297) In 
other words, if some women stand to lose access to reproductive tech-
nologies that advance their autonomy, so be it. As she sees it, the value 
in these technologies lies in their "subversive potential" (p. 248)-their 
ability to help single women, lesbians and gay men circumvent legal 
barriers to parenthood. Roberts is disappointed that "[m]ost often they 
complete a traditional nuclear family by providing a married couple with 
a child." (p. 248) Whatever her view of the value of the new technolo-
gies, Roberts does not say how depriving some women of an aspect of 
their reproductive freedom advances the cause of poor Black women. 
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Are they likely to feel that their children are somehow more valued if a 
more affluent couple is prohibited from conceiving a child?21 
In the end, Roberts wants race to take "center stage" in our delibera-
tions about reproductive health policy. (p. 311) Her "new race conscious-
ness" (p. 311) highlights the radically different experiences of the races 
where reproductive freedom is concerned and heightens our awareness 
of what it truly means to have reproductive choices. Roberts convinc-
ingly demonstrates that Black women have disproportionately suffered 
the effects of restrictive reproductive policies. Race surely has a place 
on the stage along with poverty and marital status, but as our history so 
ably demonstrates, making it the centerpiece of a concept of "reproduc-
tive justice" (p. 311) can be dangerous. The numerous injustices Black 
women have suffered should not be used to justify the subordination of 
other women's reproductive autonomy. The true test for Roberts's notion 
of positive liberty is whether it is strong enough to lift poor women of 
all races to autonomy without sacrificing other women's reproductive 
freedom. 
-Timothy Zick 
21 Roberts dismisses barriers to transracial adoptions by claiming that white couples 
only seek to adopt as a "second-best alternative." (p. 272) Even when they do adopt, 
Roberts claims that they prefer white children. (p. 273) 
